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 The relationship between state and society has recently attracted
 increasing interest (Skocpol I985). In many cases, particularly in Asia
 and the 'third world', the question has been posed in terms of how far
 the state's economic policies reflect the (real or perceived) interests of
 the capitalist class, or whether the state and its personnel act as an
 autonomous force above society pursuing policies irrelevant or even
 inimical to capitalist interests.
 Historians of Asia see the Nationalist regime in China as one of the
 most important cases through which to approach this question. This
 paper addresses the issue by analysing the Nationalist government's
 responses to capitalist pressure to help industry and commerce over-
 come the effects of the world depression in the mid I930s. Specifically
 it will examine capitalist demands and the constraints on government
 action in four key areas: China's relationship to the world economy;
 government taxes and charges; financial aid to struggling industries;
 and the establishment of economic control to tackle excessive com-
 petition and possible mismanagement by Chinese enterprises. The
 paper argues that the lessons of this case study can most profitably be
 seen in a broader context, and uses examples from several countries,
 including pre-war Japan and contemporary Indonesia, to show ways
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 in which the Chinese experience was not unique but in important
 ways paralleled that of other countries.
 The Nature of the Nationalist State
 Attempts to conceptualize the relationship between Jiang Jieshi's
 (Chiang Kai-shek's) state and Chinese society range from the basi-
 cally instrumentalist position of the French Marxist historian Jean
 Chesneaux (1977:198) to the Eastman-Coble thesis that the state was
 autonomous in relation to social forces, acting in a rapacious manner
 towards the capitalists (Eastman 1974:239-43; Coble 1980:32-5, 268-
 9). While most accept that the work of Eastman and Coble makes the
 simple instrumentalist position untenable, many remain dissatisfied
 with their alternative of complete autonomy. Most importantly,
 Bradley Geisert (1982) has put forward a pluralist model, while
 Joseph Fewsmith (I985:163-5) has seen the relationship between
 state and society mainly in terms of corporatism. More detailed
 studies by the Japanese scholar Kubo Toru (1980 and I98I) and
 Richard Bush (1982) also suggest that the capitalists were able to
 influence government policy in important ways.
 Most of this debate has been confined within the limits of Chinese
 history, but a comparative perspective can also provide many
 insights. Fewsmith makes a start by citing the corporatist fascist states
 of Europe, but are they really the most illuminating comparisons? It is
 rather states whose level of development was closer to that of China,
 such as the postwar decolonized states of south and southeast Asia,
 which faced many of the same problems and whose attempted solu-
 tions were in many ways similar.
 Ian Roxborough (1979:1 8-24) has argued that in most 'third
 world' countries the state enjoys a high degree of autonomy from its
 social background. Before the second world war, both the revolution-
 ary regime in Mexico and Ataturk's government in Ankara had
 obscure relationships to major social classes, as have many of the
 governments of newly independent third-world states since 1945. For
 instance, though operating in a very different, largely democratic,
 context, the Congress Party in India also performed a balancing act
 between progressive urban and conservative rural interests similar to
 that attempted by Jiang Jieshi (Patnaik, 1975:57-8).
 The 'New Order' in Indonesia is another case in point. The
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 Suharto regime, like Jiang's, came to power in the context of an anti-
 Communist coup. Like Jiang's it is based ultimately on military
 power, but also has pretensions to party rule and to a technocratic
 ideology of development. There again the state machine and its per-
 sonnel pressed their own institutional and individual claims even
 where these conflicted with the rights of bourgeois property. Never-
 theless the 'New Order' state does still in many ways function to
 promote the development of capitalism as a whole within the country,
 even if there are conflicts of interest within the capitalist class between
 those whose main connections are with the state and more purely
 'private' capitalists (Robison I986).
 China and the Depression
 The impact of the world depression in China was less severe than in
 the developed world. Indeed some deny China suffered from a
 'depression' at all. Many macro indicators suggest that it did not:
 Chang's index of industrial production, for instance, grew throughout
 the period (Chang I969:60-I). This was in fact common in less devel-
 oped countries, where various factors, including limited dependence
 on foreign trade, low initial levels of industrialization and the recovery
 of tariff autonomy (for instance, by both Turkey and Egypt as well as
 China in the early I930s), meant that industrial growth continued
 through the depression, though at a reduced rate (Berberoglu
 1980:97; Tignor 1984:109, 123).
 Nevertheless, three factors meant that the government was still
 confronted with an economic crisis. First, the output figures alone
 understate the impact of the downturn, as the main effect was on
 prices, profits and especially the incomes of peasants involved in the
 market economy. Second, the political crisis was more serious than
 might be indicated just by aggregate national statistics, since the
 impact of the depression was greatest on the commercialized and
 industrialized areas of central China, which the Nanjing government
 controlled and depended on: Chang's figures, by including the
 mineral industries and Manchuria, are unrepresentative of the areas
 controlled by Nanjing (Coble i980:300-I). Among the consumer
 industries in these areas, the worst hit was silk, which suffered from
 secular as well as cyclical problems, with the emergence of artificial
 fibres, so that the fall in its price was insufficient to counteract the
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 contraction in world demand. Cotton yarn, flour and other consumer
 industries also encountered serious problems in the mid 1930s, though
 these were not always reflected in any fall in output.
 Third and most important, whatever the statistics show in hind-
 sight, the literature at the time portrayed a situation of chronic crisis.
 In the mid I930s, British observers feared the complete collapse of
 China's economy (Trotter 1975:135), and Chinese economists posed
 the question in terms not of any improvement in the economy but of
 its very survival (SBYK December 1934:12). Whereas the British
 concern was for an export market and the repayment of loans, for the
 Chinese the depression was inextricably tied up with the broader
 national crisis. Thus concern over the effects of the depression reached
 a peak when one of China's leading cotton mills was auctioned by a
 British bank to which it was mortgaged, and was apparently bought
 by Japanese interests (Bush 1982:257-64).
 Granting that China experienced an economic downturn at least in
 terms of prices and profits, the timing was different in China from in
 the West. The decline in the value of its silver currency protected
 China to a large extent from I929 to late 1931 (the exceptions being
 the gold-currency-based northeast and the silk industry). After the
 British and Japanese abandonment of the gold standard late in that
 year, however, China entered a period of deflation, falling profits and
 in some cases falling output, with the trough coming in I935.
 Recovery began late that year, though only from November 1936 did
 there begin a sustained and continuing rise in both prices and output,
 and I937 showed very strong growth in the modern sector.
 Government and Business Responses to the Depression
 The question of how to respond to the impact of the world depression
 became an issue between the Nanjing government and the Chinese
 capitalist class. The capitalists had emerged as a political force mainly
 ip Shanghai in the I9Ios and I92os, a period of industrial growth and
 a weak government unable to impose its control (Coble I980:19-25).
 Although during the Nanjing decade they faced a stronger regime
 interested in exerting control over them, there were still several
 institutions through which they could express their views. Apart from
 the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, by the mid 1930S
 partly under Nationalist Party control, the key role was played by the
 industry associations, of which the best known were the Shanghai
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 Bankers' and the Cotton Mill Owners' Associations, though most
 industries had their own organizations.
 Individually and through these organizations, business interests
 put a series of demands to the government by means of public and
 private petitions. Three packages of proposals to overcome the crisis
 were also developed, one submitted by cotton interests to the
 Nationalist Party's Fifth Plenum (GWZB I January 1935:1), two
 emerging from public meetings in March 1935 (GWZB 4 March
 1935:5; GSBYK 15 April I935:9). Finally individual capitalists and
 sympathetic intellectuals used the pages of Chinese newspapers and
 periodicals such as Yinhang zhoubao (Bankers' Weekly) to push their
 case.
 For their part, despite differences of opinion with the capitalists,
 neither the Nationalist Party nor the government should necessarily
 be seen as entirely anti-capitalist. There were certainly anti-capitalist
 elements in Party ideology and policy, as indeed there were among the
 Japanese state bureaucracy eventually responsible for the economic
 'miracle' (Johnson 1982:io8). Thus, economist Ma Yinchu pointed
 out the contradiction between a programme of economic nationalism
 aimed at supporting Chinese against foreign capital and a domestic
 policy which stressed the restriction of capital (DFZZ I July 1937:i o).
 The Party was also suspicious of small capitalists and dubious about
 their ability to develop heavy industry in particular (Kirby i984:79-
 8o). Nevertheless, most of the capitalists discussed in this paper were
 involved in light industry, which was to remain the province of private
 enterprise. Moreover, although one can quote from Party motions
 condemning capitalism, there was considerable ambiguity on this
 question, and the Fifth Plenum did pass the package to help the
 cotton industrialists. Nationalism suggested strong support for
 Chinese capital, and a left-Nationalist elder wrote an article for
 Bankers' Weekly trying to lay to rest some of the anti-capitalist feelings
 he admitted were prevalent among young people and party members
 (YHZB 7 February I933:I-4).
 Nor were the leading figures in the government consistently anti-
 capitalist. Even Chen Gongbo, the left-Nationalist Minister of
 Industry in the mid I930S, explicitly supported capitalist industry in
 China. He toldJulean Arnold, the American commercial attache, that
 he was 'favorable to the capitalist system for the time being', though
 one cannot put too much weight on such a statement to an American
 official (Arnold Papers Box 6: 'Report for the week ended August 5,
 1933'). Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong), Finance Minister up to I933 and
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 JiangJieshi's brother-in-law, can hardly be called anti-capitalist even
 if he wished to expand his own empire at others' expense; the same
 could probably, with a little less confidence, be said for his brother-in-
 law and successor as Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi.
 Most importantly, the Nationalist state, especially when viewed in
 its regional context, operated within a social structure which limited
 its options in relation to the interests of dominant classes. To take an
 extreme example, it could not, without changing its very nature,
 support the workers against the capitalists or the peasants against the
 landlords. The government recognized it was working predominantly
 within a basically capitalist modern sector. Although it had some
 conflicts of interest with that sector, it nevertheless had a stake in its
 prosperity and growth. As Chen Guangfu (I96I:88) pointed out,
 because of the government's proximity to Shanghai, it 'could not do
 too many unreasonable things or enact too many unreasonable laws'.
 Indeed it 'was more enlightened and competent than its predecessor
 military regimes'. Thus it was in its interest to respond to capitalist
 concerns over imports, taxation, liquidity and economic control.
 China's Relationship to the World Economy
 Many capitalists and most other groups saw as the state's first duty
 resistance to 'imperialist oppression' --the term they used to con-
 ceptualize China's relationship to the world economy which they saw
 as the origin of the country's problems. Few believed China could be
 entirely cut off from the world (the country had much less of a self-
 sufficient industrial base than it did in the I96os at the height of'self-
 reliance') but they felt that the world trend was towards economic
 nationalism and autarchy, and were quite happy for China to follow.
 Thus one senior bureaucrat on the National Economic Council
 argued:
 China was originally a country able naturally to be self-sufficient. But
 because the lack of industrial development forced reliance on imported
 manufactured goods, while for various reasons substantial quantities of agri-
 cultural products were exported, the current national economic crisis
 emerged. If we are to resolve this crisis, the only way is to rouse ourselves to
 pursue the path of self-sufficiency (SJY May I935:33).
 This concern with China's relationship to the world economy
 reflected both the broader national crisis and the essentially import-
 substituting nature of China's early industrialization. Ever since the
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 end of the boom of the late I9IOS, Chinese industry had perceived
 itself as suffering from severe competition from imported goods. The
 flood of cheap Japanese imports from I932 made possible by the
 depreciated yen greatly heightened this perception. Often Chinese
 companies saw these imports as the mechanism forcing down prices in
 China and undermining Chinese industries across the board, from
 coal to cotton yarns and matches (Wright 1984:1 Io; Quanguo jingji
 weiyuanhui 1935:3-4; SSKY 1980:1.414). Although competition from
 imports declined after I933 because of the higher tariff, the tariff wall
 was partly evaded by widespread smuggling. Moreover, perhaps
 because of the Japanese threat to China as a whole, 'dumping' was
 perceived as a danger long after it had ceased to be one.
 Tariff-based import-substituting industrialization was a common
 response to the depression on the part of the independent 'third world'
 countries. In countries as various as Turkey, Egypt and Brazil,
 national industry developed through the 193os behind a wall of higher
 tariffs (Berberoglu i980:102, Tignor I984:I I ; Frank I97I:204). Even
 in the colonized countries the state responded in a similar though
 weaker way, as in India, where the sugar and cotton industries grew
 as a result of higher tariffs (Markovits 1985:58).
 In China, too, the belief that imports were oppressing Chinese
 industry led naturally to calls for protection. After China regained full
 tariff autonomy in I933, Song Ziwen introduced measures to protect
 Chinese industry (Coble 1980:125). Pressure from the Japanese and
 the military's demands for resources, however, forced Song's resigna-
 tion, and in July 1934 a revised schedule lowered the tariffs on certain
 key Japanese imports competing with Chinese products. Protests and
 petitions opposing the change emanated from the Shanghai Chamber
 of Commerce and Shanghai newspapers as well as from cotton mill
 interests (CWR 7 July 1934:224, 14 July I934:262, 21 July
 1934:303-4).
 Despite this blow, Chinese industry continued to press in late 1934
 and I935 for increased protection. In I935, a group of fifty Chinese
 factories in Shanghai petitioned the government, calling for the adop-
 tion of a protective tariff (CWR 8 June I935:72), and the annual
 meeting of the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners Association in Shanghai
 again bemoaned the effects of the 1934 tariff revision and called for
 'balanced' tax treatment in order to aid competition with foreign
 goods (YHZB 28 May I935:guoneiyaowen [hereafter GNYW] 3-4).
 Business interests tended, however, to believe that tariffs should be
 totally protective: if imports still came in, they must be being dumped
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 and a dumping tax should be imposed. This was the message of the
 head of the Flour Manufacturers' Association when calling for relief
 for his industry in September 1933 (YHZB 5 September I933:GNYW
 6), and a similar message came from cement manufacturers (SB 24
 February 1934).
 The interests of the state itself were the most powerful factor impel-
 ling it to resist such demands. In any choice between the revenue-
 raising and protective functions of tariffs, the government's military
 priorities, which left little room for cutting expenditures, forced it to
 choose the former. In addition, facing a strong and aggressive Japan,
 Jiang's regime was willing to trade economic concessions for political
 breathing space, to the disapproval of many patriotic elements. This
 was clearly shown by Song's forced resignation in 1933 and remained
 the situation up to the war.
 In addition, however, the message the government was receiving
 from the capitalists was by no means unambiguous: tariff protection
 benefits and harms different sectors of the community, with the
 general pattern being for producers of the raw material or intermedi-
 ate good to favour increased tariffs, the consuming industries (the
 scattered final consumers were much less influential) to oppose them.
 Disputes along these lines took place for instance between printers
 and paper producers (Kubo Toru I98I:48, 50), and between grain
 traders (and possibly through them rural interests) and flour millers
 (YHZB 19 December i933:GNYW 2).
 In the even more important cotton industry, merchants attempted
 to keep up prices, and their profits, by calling for increased tariffs on
 imported cotton (YHZB 16 April i935:GNYW I-2). Those banks
 which held stocks of mortgaged cotton supported this call. But the
 powerful cotton textile interests, which in part used imported raw
 materials, and whose costs would be raised by any increase in the
 tariff, argued that such a move would lead to further mill closures,
 especially as mills in Japan did not have to pay any tax on imported
 cotton (YHZB 23 April I935:GNYW 1-3). The government sup-
 ported the cotton mills, arguing that the earlier tariff had already
 sharply reduced imports, and current imports were mainly of high
 grade cotton, which did not compete with the Chinese product.
 Moreover, cotton prices had fallen only in relation to an artificially
 high speculative price at the end of the previous year (YHZB I I June
 I935:GNYW i). So the government gave little ground on this issue,
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 Government Taxes and Charges
 Some of the most insistent capitalist pressure came in calls for reduc-
 tions in government taxes and charges, which they saw as penalizing
 the struggling industrial sector. Though the world has probably yet to
 see a businessperson who fails to complain about the level of taxes, the
 Nationalist government's reliance on taxes levied on the modern sec-
 tor may have meant that the burden in China was especially heavy
 (Paauw 1957). Moreover, the Chinese-owned sector, for instance in
 the cotton yarn and tobacco industries, complained that the structure
 of taxes, which tended to fall more heavily on cheaper products,
 discriminated against them in favor of imports or the products of
 foreign factories in China (SB 27 January 1934; DFZZ i6 December
 I934:27-35).
 The Nationalists had already acted to improve the situation by
 abolishing likin and the local transit taxes. But in the I930s, when
 prices and profits were falling, concern over taxation increased, and
 many industries saw tax relief as the primary avenue for government
 assistance. When canvassed for ideas on the relief of their industry,
 nearly all the major coal mines asked for a reduction in taxes (JJDA
 I7-24-8-I). Tobacco interests also made numerous requests for re-
 duced taxes on cigarettes, though cuts came only in 1937 after Song
 Ziwen had bought into the largest Chinese-owned tobacco company
 (Cochran I980: 197; Coble I980:23I-2). The flour industry's demands
 were aimed mainly at local governments which taxed the transport of
 wheat to the mills (YHZB 5 September i933:GNYW 6).
 In some industries a high price elasticity of demand both increased
 the problems caused by higher taxes and decreased the revenue gains
 to the government. Even the National Economic Council argued in a
 1935 report that high taxes were a particular problem for the match
 industry. The recent increase in rates had not resulted in a commen-
 surate rise in government revenue, while seriously adding to the
 people's burdens. Thus a reduction in the rate of tax was crucial for
 the relief of the industry (Quanguo jingji weiyuanhui 1935:7 ). The
 match manufacturers agreed, and industry leader Liu Hongsheng
 wrote to the Finance Minister in December 1935, listing tax cuts as
 one major way the industry could be helped (SSKY I98I:2.207).
 The development of the consolidated tax to replace likin (Young
 1971:63-7) and its gradual extension to an increasing number of
 commodities created a clear focus of conflict. In February i934 the
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 National Cement Manufacturers' Association argued that their busi-
 ness had been adversely affected by the recent rise in consolidated
 taxes (SB 25 February I934). Most importantly, the cotton industry
 argued for a reduction in the tax on cotton yarn, but was successful
 only in resisting attempts to raise it (Bush I982:248-57). As the China
 Weekly Review (6 April 1935:187) wrote:
 It has been agreed among the industrialists that the Government should be
 requested to extend immediate help to the Chinese mills in order to tide over
 the present urgent difficulties. All seem to have unanimously believed that
 the only means to pull the industry out of the rut is to lower the consolidated
 tax or to raise the tax on the imported cotton piece goods.
 Equal treatment for Chinese and foreign cotton mills in the imposition
 of consolidated tax was first on a list of relief proposals advanced by
 the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners Association in I933, though the
 second item suggested giving Chinese mills an advantage by refund-
 ing some of their tax payments (YHZB 4 July I933:8-9).
 Again the interests of the state left little leeway for the Finance
 Ministry to grant the sort of tax cuts requested. During the Nanjing
 decade the central government ran continuous financial deficits (Tien
 1972:76-7). Moreover it was almost entirely dependent on indirect
 taxes on consumption, with the consolidated tax making up a growing
 proportion of its receipts and having the further advantage over the
 excise taxes of being more firmly under central control (Tien I972:78,
 8o). Given that situation, it would have taken a major reorientation of
 government priorities to give much ground on the issue. Leading
 economist Ma Yinchu saw the solution in terms of the replacement of
 consumption taxes with the more equitable direct income tax (DFZZ
 I July 1937:I3). But, certainly in the short term, such a proposal
 wildly overestimated the actual tax-collecting capacity of the Chinese
 state.
 Finance and Liquidity
 A third focus of interaction between business and the government was
 industry's hope that the latter, possibly in collaboration with the
 private banks, would act to increase the availability of liquid capital.
 Bush ( 982:306) argues that the major thrust of activity by cotton mill
 owners was the search for credit, and proposals to increase bank
 reserves and therefore lending capabilities formed a prominent part of
 the relief package advanced in spring 1935, as did suggestions for
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 government-backed loans and the establishment of a bill market.
 These proposals also, however, ran up against both the state's
 financial and political weakness and its interest in extending its own
 power and revenue-raising capacity in the economy.
 Struggling industrialists attributed many of their immediate prob-
 lems to a lack of liquidity, and thence to the American silver-purchas-
 ing policy of I934-I935 which was draining China of silver and
 reducing the money supply (Young 1971:2 1 I-1 5). Another factor seen
 as limiting liquidity for Chinese companies was the lack of a com-
 mercial bill market, forcing them instead to rely on short-term high-
 interest loans from native banks. This whole issue is a very complex
 one, and figures for non-silver money supply throw doubt on the very
 existence of a liquidity crisis, suggesting that the companies' problems
 lay elsewhere (Rawski I989:179). Nevertheless the issue still formed
 an important focus of debate between business and the Nanjing
 government.
 Industrialists complained also that the banking sector concentrated
 its investments too much in government bonds, to the neglect of
 industry. For their part the bankers did not see aid to industry as a
 prime duty. Zhang Jiaao (1960:71) wrote later: 'agricultural and
 industrial credit was not within the purview of the Bank of China,'
 and one of China's leading private bankers, Chen Guangfu (1961:42-
 3), complained, 'Some people have the mistaken notion that a bank's
 function is to help ... industry,' and argued, 'the business motive is
 basic, not the idea of helping people ... The idea of helping industry
 is not very strong.'
 On the other hand Zhang (I960:7I) recognized that 'in a time of
 national crisis, the Bank [of China] had the responsibility to take the
 lead'. In fact, many examples from the cotton and coal industries
 indicate that by the late 1920s the modern Chinese banks were
 already a major source of funds for existing enterprises in trouble
 (Wright I984:I5I-2; Yan Zhongping i963:228-39). Beyond that, the
 banks were beginning to adopt a broader entrepreneurial role, for
 instance through Song Ziwen's China Development Finance Corpora-
 tion, which the American commercial attache described as 'viewed by
 Chinese bankers as being a very helpful step in the direction of
 cooperation between the government and the bankers, or vice versa,
 in the financing of domestic industrial and commercial develop-
 ments'. (Arnold Papers Box 6: 'Report for the Week Ended June 9,
 I934'.)
 Proposals for the government to raise or guarantee loans which
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 would then be re-lent to individual industries or enterprises were not
 new. In 1933 the government decided to float a Y5' million bond issue
 to aid the silk industry, and proposed a Y20 million loan to help the
 cotton industry (YHZB 30 May I933:7). Similar proposals were made
 in both i933 and 1935 in the coal industry, where the aim was mainly
 to rehabilitate the obsolescent rolling stock of the Chinese railways
 (KYZB 7 June 1933:1I, 7 September 1935:577; FC 1 September
 I935:271). On an individual basis, China's cotton king, Rong Zong-
 jing, asked the government in 1934 to guarantee an issue of bonds to
 save his Shenxin cotton mills (SSKY 1980: I.415). None of these pro-
 posals came to fruition, and even the silk loan was never fully subs-
 cribed, though the taxes levied to repay it were levied in full, so the
 industry was actually worse off (Coble I980:156-7).
 Such proposals were revived on a more ambitious scale in early
 1935, when industry pressed the government to sponsor a massive
 loan programme to increase liquidity. The government's response has
 to be seen in the context of its wish to extend its control over the
 banks. Thus on 20 March I935 the Ministry of Finance announced
 the floating of a Yloo million bond issue to help relieve industry and
 commerce (GWZB I April I935:5). But two days later Dagongbao (22
 March 1935) reported that the real plan was what actually happened:
 to use the YIoo million instead to buy new shares which the banks
 were forced to issue, giving the government control over the two major
 private banks in China, the Bank of China and the Bank of
 Communications.
 Throughout much of I935 discussion continued over a Y20 million
 loan package to help industry, of which Y5 million came to be tagged
 for small business (see issues of YHZB for 1935). However, the Native
 Bankers' Association refused to collaborate, arguing that they were
 already the main providers of credit to small business, with at least
 YI2 million in loans outstanding, so that there was no point in par-
 ticipating in any new syndicate (DGB 17 March I935). Even the
 modern banks were willing only to contribute a small amount (YHZB
 7 May i935:GNYW I-2). The Finance Ministry also argued that it
 could not directly advance its half of the loan for small business, and
 put the responsibility with the banks (YHZB 23 April i935:GNYW
 3-4).
 Only after a further deepening of the liquidity crisis, during which
 the government had to extend a loan to the native banks, thereby
 Y: Chinese silver dollar.
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 bringing that sector under its control (YHZB I I June I935:GNYW 6-
 8, i8 June I935:GNYW 2-3; McElderry 1976:177-8), was a commit-
 tee established to manage loans to the value of Y2o million (YHZB 30
 July I935:GNYW 2-5, 6 August i935:GNYW 10-12). Even then the
 prominent role played by Green Gang leader Du Yuesheng suggests
 that the scheme resulted in part in an expansion of gangster control
 over Shanghai business rather than, or possibly as well as, restoring
 commercial health (YHZB 25 June I935:GNYW i).
 Major government participation in loan schemes for industry was
 always unlikely given its stretched resources. The central government
 cited its own financial stringency when trying to shift the responsi-
 bility for financing relief for the silk industry on to the Shanghai city
 government (YHZB 6 February I934:GNYW 8). In any case, such
 direct bailing out of unprofitable enterprises has always been a ques-
 tionable road for any government to take.
 Government support for reform of the financial market, and especi-
 ally the creation of a modern market for commercial bills, offered a
 less expensive, though still problematic, alternative. The silk piece
 goods industrialists, who were very dependent on outside sources for
 short-term working capital, took the lead in March 1935 by attempt-
 ing to establish a system of commercial bills (SYYB March 1935: I-9;
 Lieu I94I:179-83). They appealed for rediscounting facilities to the
 Central Bank, which replied that, although it was a good way to
 increase liquidity, the banks would have to agree to discount the bills
 before the Central Bank could rediscount them (YHZB 26 March
 I935:GNYW 3). A bankers' meeting on 2 April agreed to discount the
 bills (YHZB 9 April i935:GNYW 2), and the scheme was put into
 operation. In practice, however, its scope of operation remained
 limited (Lieu 1941:I84), and it did not make any major difference to
 the operation of the industry.
 Interest in the question continued, however, and in August I935 a
 working party reported that while there was no real shortfall in the
 money supply there was a lack of instruments of credit. It advocated
 the extension of the use of company bonds and commercial paper to
 replace the less flexible overdrafts and mortgages. This would ease the
 short-term crisis of Chinese industry, while in the longer term over-
 coming the speculative nature of the Chinese financial system (in
 Guobao 1936). Although thirty-eight banks participated in a bill dis-
 counting house in March 1936, this move never fulfilled its expected
 functions (Zhongguojindai jinrong shi bianxie zu 1985:1 7 ).
 The obstacles to the implementation of these proposals came less
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 from the government's weakness than from that of the capitalist sector
 itself. Many observers argued it was the lack of credit-worthiness of
 Chinese industry which prevented bankers from discounting their
 bills, and thus obstructed the formation of a bill market (YHZB 23
 April 1935:9, I October 1935:13; Yi Shi 1935:9).
 The government eventually moved to ease the liquidity crisis by
 permitting the banks to include bank acceptances and treasury certifi-
 cates issued by the Committee of the Shanghai Bankers' Joint Reserve
 Board as deposit for legal tender notes. This had featured as part of
 the March 1935 proposals, but was only instituted in early 1936
 (CESR February I936:3). But the recovery of profits in response to
 rising prices and demand was a more important boost to the financial
 health of Chinese companies than were any institutional reforms.
 Economic Control
 A final area of government-business interaction was the attempt to
 institute 'economic control' in order to overcome excessive competi-
 tion and poor management, factors often seen as underlying China's
 industrial troubles. Though this accorded more closely with the
 state's aim to increase its own power, it proved far beyond its
 capabilites.
 Increased state involvement in the economy was a common, almost
 universal, response to the depression, which had undermined the idea
 that the market could on its own satisfactorily regulate capitalist
 economies. In Turkey, the depression was a key factor in the expan-
 sion of the role of the state, as 'Etatism' became one of the six 'arrows'
 of Kemalist ideology, assigning to the state the major responsibility
 for founding and managing new import-substituting industries.
 There, as in China, it was unclear what role remained for private
 enterprise (Hale i980 and I98I; Berberoglu I980). This trend was
 indeed so strong that a minority view even in the British government
 in India favoured intervention to support prices, arguing that 'the
 world is moving towards a stage where economic planning by Govern-
 ments is becoming more and more necessary' (Tomlinson I979:89).
 More broadly, the state has played a key role in the economic
 development especially of late-comers (Gerschenkron I962:I6-2I),
 and the same is true for the more recent East Asian success stories. In
 the 1930s the Soviet Union was the main example of a state-run
 economy, but the European fascist states were also influential in a
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 world-wide tendency in that direction. For China the most direct
 influence came from Japan, which was embarking on the initial and
 imperfect stages of its 'developmental state' (Johnson I982:I7,33)
 partly as a response to the depression.
 There are striking parallels between the thinking behind economic
 control in China and in Japan, where the government also moved
 under the slogan 'industrial rationalization' to institute control over
 enterprises to improve management and replace competition with
 cooperation through setting up cartels Johnson I982:I04). The les-
 sons from Japan were not lost on the Chinese: the National Economic
 Commission attributed some of the success of the Japanese cotton
 industry to 'the spirit of unity in their industry' (JJDA 26-01-38-2),
 and Chinese coal owners were won over to the idea of a cartel after a
 favourable evaluation of the Japanese experience (Wright 1985: 39).
 One major target of control in China as in Japan was excessive
 competition and backward management. A leading economic
 bureaucrat argued that 'unfortunately competition within individual
 industries in China has led to unfavourable results' in that there were
 too many followers of a successful innovation, and so sales were made
 at below cost, affecting the whole industry (ZSZ June I935:983). Such
 a perception was possibly more strongly held by government officials
 than by business. When the Ministry of Industry canvassed opinions
 from the coal companies, the replies mostly stressed the need to
 reduce taxes and transport charges, but the government official
 involved identified the main problem as that of competition, an issue
 that needed government intervention (JJDA I7-24-8-I). Nevertheless,
 industrialist Liu Hongsheng believed excessive competition in the
 match industry exposed it to imperialist aggression, and in I934 the
 China Match Manufacturers' Association put the problem in terms of
 a 'lack of spirit of unity' (SSKY 1981:2.177).
 The developmental state also concerned itself with the perceived
 backward management practices of the private sector. In Japan, the
 state wished to use the industrial rationalization movement to raise
 the efficiency and technological level ofJapanese enterprises Johnson
 I982:o18). In China, an essay in a volume edited by the Minister of
 Industry listed irrational organization and irrational management as
 two key internally-generated problems of national industry (Gu
 Yuquan 1935:65). Such opinions could also be found in the private
 sector: Chen Guangfu (196I:43) recalled his belief that poor manage-
 ment, speculation and over-expansion were the cause of the much-




 I934-I935; the banks lent the company Y7 million in I933 only on
 condition that its management be taken over by a special committee
 appointed by themselves. Chinese observers also pointed to the tech-
 nical backwardness of Chinese firms, which some argued prevented
 them from competing on equal terms with their Japanese-owned
 counterparts (Shi Fengtao I935:87; Gu Yuquan 1935:65-66; CWR 6
 April 1935:187).
 Such structural problems required, many agreed, a thoroughgoing
 solution encompassing at least cartelization within the industries and
 probably the extension of government control. Industry self-regula-
 tion was the initial choice for both business and government given the
 low level of institutionalization of the developmental state even in
 Japan (Johnson I982:I09). The most comprehensive, but still unsuc-
 cessful, attempt at self regulation in China was the agreement in 1933
 by cotton mill owners to cut output as a way of shoring up the price of
 cotton yarn (YHZB 25 April i933:GNYW 2-3). Arrived at with great
 difficulty, this scheme remained effective over only a short period and
 failed to achieve its aim (Bush 1982:207-13).
 Mostly, however, government intervention was sought. Although
 'economic control' can be seen as an aspect of 'bureaucratic capital-
 ism', its relationship with the private sector was in fact an ambiguous
 one. All sections of Chinese society accepted and even welcomed a
 greater role for the state in economic and political development, and
 there were few advocates of an entirely free-enterprise laissez-faire
 economy. In March 1935, match interests warned: 'due to business
 depression, even this industry is encountering serious difficulties,
 which, if not solved with the assistance of the Government, may lead
 to the collapse of the final branch in the national industrial edifice (FC
 27 March i935:356)' Even foreign observers accepted the need for the
 government to play a role. A British Foreign Office expert argued:
 'The growth of Chinese industry ... had in the main been due to
 individual initiative and the play of economic forces, but in the last
 five years [I928-I933] this natural process has been stimulated by
 official intervention (PRO F037I/I8o52, F I I /I!/I).'
 Most observers, like the cotton textile pioneer Mu Ouchu and the
 banker Chen Guangfu, were therefore less concerned with the desir-
 ability of implementing economic control than with its feasibility
 (YHZB 26 September 1933:7-9; Chen Guangfu I949:I58-9). Few
 called for the government to withdraw from industry, many more
 denounced the inadequacy of its efforts and criticized official policies
 as 'merely empty words' (DFZZ I April 1935:28). Groups of
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 industrialists called for state control if they felt it would benefit their
 own immediate interests. Such policies, therefore, did not necessarily
 violate the perceived interests of the private sector.
 Specific proposals for economic control included the petition from
 the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to the Ministry of
 Industry in May I935, which cited as justification the fragmentation
 of Chinese enterprise and the necessity for cooperation: with surplus
 production in many sectors, government control was necessary to
 avert economic collapse (YHZB 7 May i935:GNYW 4-5). The I935
 relief package for the cotton industry, which probably reflected
 industry opinion, called for the institution of control to regulate pro-
 duction and sales (Xu Xuehan 1936:88). At the time, cotton mills
 were being squeezed between expensive raw cotton and cheap yarn,
 while Chinese mills felt threatened by their foreign-owned com-
 petitors; the industry had tried but largely failed in its own attempts
 to reduce output, and government intervention seemed the most
 promising answer.
 In the silk industry, most commentators also saw a major role for
 government regulation. In 1934, after Song Ziwen's return from the
 World Economic Conference with new ideas of economic control, the
 China Weekly Review (6 January I934:241) wrote:
 To the average business men who have very much despaired because of
 business depression, this government attempt to rationalize important
 industries has been welcomed as a panacea to economic ills.... The silkmen,
 who have been hit especially hard by business depression, have pressed the
 government most eagerly for the immediate organization of a Committee for
 Rationalization of the Silk Industry as a measure to relieve the present silk
 distress.
 Later that year producers in the lower Yangzi area asked for govern-
 ment funds to establish a sales organization to promote silk exports
 (CWR 15 September 1934:96).
 A general pattern in calls for economic control was for major pro-
 ducers to seek government support in order to police output restric-
 tions and prevent new entrants into a given industry. In the match
 industry Liu Hongsheng petitioned the government in April 1934 to
 institute control in order to avoid 'excessive' competition and raise
 selling prices: Liu himself, as the largest producer, had an interest in
 restraining small but growing competitors. Though the matter was
 referred to the National Economic Council, the Executive Yuan
 argued that such output restrictions had no basis in law, and in any
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 case would be unenforceable against foreign-owned factories (SSKY
 1981:2.172-6; Cochran 1988:36-40).
 The government's response to calls for economic control emanated
 mainly from the National Economic Council and the Ministry of
 Industry. The former was officially established by Song Ziwen in 1933
 as an agency for economic development, initially funded from the
 proceeds of the US Cotton and Wheat Loan. Japanese opposition
 soon dashed the original high hopes, however, leading to Song's
 resignation as Minister of Finance and a sharp reduction in the size of
 the US loan; possibly only the intervention of the League of Nations
 representative with Jiang Jieshi led to Song remaining head of the
 Council (Coble i980:I36-7; Arnold Papers Box 6: 'Report for the
 week ended December 3o, I933').
 Both cotton and silk came under the auspices of the National Econ-
 omic Council, which in October 1933 established the Cotton Industry
 Control Commission, with at least four major industrialists among its
 eighteen members (YHZB 24 October I933:GNYW 4). One of its
 early, but unsuccessful, initiatives was to establish a company to buy
 up yarn on the Shanghai exchange to try to maintain prices (Bush
 I982:229). Although always intending to attempt to rationalize the
 affairs of the cotton mills, financial constraints meant that the bulk of
 the Commission's work focused on improving the strains of cotton
 grown by Chinese farmers. The Sericulture Improvement Commis-
 sion concentrated even more on the production of raw materials
 rather than the troubles of the filatures, though the two were
 intimately connected.
 Under Ministers Chen Gongbo (I931-I935) and Wu Dingchang
 (I935-I937), the Ministry of Industry developed several schemes to
 control both industry and commerce and especially the export trades,
 which the Japanese bureaucrats also addressed first (Johnson
 I982:98). The China Vegetable Oil Company and China Tea Cor-
 poration were two examples of such schemes. Although Coble
 (1980:243-5) stresses the degree to which these companies
 encroached on private enterprise, they also tackled real economic
 problems: even the government's American advisers believed that
 vegetable oil was the most promising export industry in which to
 develop control, though they felt that it should be put under the
 National Economic Council (Young Papers Box 53, 'Wood Oil':
 Memorandum). Less frequently, the Ministry attempted to involve
 itself in the control of production, as in the 1936 attempt to set up a
 coal cartel (JJDA I7-24-8-I; Wright 1985).
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 The obstacles in the way of these schemes lay not in any opposition
 from free-enterprise capitalism, but rather in the fundamental weak-
 ness of the Chinese state itself. The Nationalist government lacked the
 political and economic resources to practise economic control. The
 failure of the National Economic Council to help the cotton and silk
 industries was essentially due to a lack of finance, and the Ministry of
 Industry, while more successful in gaining control over key areas of
 commerce, seldom managed to raise the funds to establish new
 manufacturing facilities.
 Political resources were also lacking, in that the state's control over
 society was limited both geographically and institutionally. The
 government's realization of this was one reason why it favoured self-
 regulation by industries (JJDA I7-24-8-I). The Ministry of Industry
 could not even enforce its plan for coal cartelization on the govern-
 ment-owned Huainan mine in Anhui, run by Song Ziwen's National
 Reconstruction Commission. China's lack of political integration also
 affected privately sponsored cartels. While Liu Hongsheng's attempts
 to form a match cartel were reasonably successful within the lower
 and middle Yangzi and southeast coast regions (Cochran, I988:43-5),
 it proved very difficult to implement control on a national basis;
 Chinese factories in Shandong and in South China resisted attempts
 to integrate them into the scheme.
 Another important limitation on the government's power came
 from the protection foreign companies enjoyed under the unequal
 treaties. The powers were generally opposed to the idea of control. A
 British official commented: 'The establishment of monopolies would
 be disastrous to British interests in China.' On the other hand, the
 head of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department, admitted: 'State
 control of industry was not contemplated in I858, and even since 1922
 the idea has made headway. It seems somewhat difficult to deny the
 Chinese government the right to advance in that direction (PRO
 F037I/i7142, F6o68/6o68/ o).' The Japanese, though less opposed
 ideologically, had no compunction in resisting any proposals which
 threatened their interests, and Japanese coal companies in Shandong
 prevented the formation of a coal cartel in 1936 (Wright 1985: I43-4).
 In the match industry the government's reluctance to confront
 Japanese and American interests led to the temporary shelving of the
 plan for control (SSKY 198I:2. 75-6; SJYJuly I935:78). Continuing
 efforts by Liu Hongsheng eventually succeeded in involving both
 groups, but on terms very favourable to the foreigners (SSKY
 1981:2.219-25). The scheme was supposed to come into operation
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 with government support in February I937, though the omission of
 the factories in south China led to scepticism over its prospects for
 success (Cochran, I988:45; Arnold Papers Box 6: 'China Annual
 Economic Report for 1936').
 With the exception of banking and currency, which in most
 countries remain partly the province of the state, regulation therefore
 made little impact on Chinese industry before I937. When the
 economy recovered in late 1936 and 1937, it was still mainly under the
 auspices of private enterprise, with companies like Rong Zongjing's
 cotton mills resuming their expansion: in I936 they passed their
 previous peaks of production both of cotton yarn and cotton cloth,
 and made over Y3 million profit (SSKY I980:I.522,615).
 Conclusion
 No simple conclusion emerges from the history of government-busi-
 ness relations during the world depression, but this paper, while by no
 means going back to the old instrumentalist model, differs from the
 Coble-Eastman thesis in key respects. It stresses the importance of
 the structure within which the Nationalist regime operated, and
 which meant that it was in its own interest to try to encourage a
 healthy capitalist sector, while at the same time limiting its ability to
 bring this about. It is important not to see the relationship between
 state and capital as a zero-sum game. Especially for catch-up
 industrializers the state can play a very important role in promoting
 capitalist development.
 The paper also stresses the use of a comparative perspective to
 argue that China's experience was by no means unique. Important
 differences of course existed between China and countries such as
 Japan, Turkey or Indonesia. China's size and its limited integration
 into the world economy may have given its government more room to
 manoeuvre, though this point is less compelling when focusing on the
 region under Nanjing's direct control. On the other hand, the even
 greater pressures, external and internal, that China faced probably
 made its government weaker domestically than in most of the other
 cases.
 Nevertheless, China's response to the world depression, even in the
 area of 'economic control', was not just a function of specifically
 Chinese conditions. It is best seen not solely within the trajectory of
 Chinese history, but in a broader context of responses by states in
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 underdeveloped countries to the conditions of the world depression
 and, more generally, to the needs of import-substituting
 industrialization.
 China in the 1930s was still in the import-substituting phase of
 industrialization, a period during which the national bourgeoisie was
 still weak, requiring a high degree of'Bonapartist' intervention on the
 part of the state (Hamilton I982:I38). Likewise Robison (I985:302)
 describes the state in Indonesia in the 1950S as 'the only concentration
 of political and economic power with the potential to develop national
 capitalism', while Berberoglu (I980:97) writes that the depression
 forced the Turkish state to take the leading role, replacing the 'small,
 weak and incapacitated national industrial bourgeoisie.'
 Thus state intervention in the economy was not simply as an
 imposition on an unwilling capitalist class, as Coble's argument
 implies. While industrialists like Rong Zongjing and Liu Hongsheng
 did not want the state to take over their enterprises, they were not
 averse to calling on state aid when it suited their purposes. It is far
 from clear that the major policy decisions of the I930S (a much more
 important indicator than statements by government leaders) were as
 damaging to capitalist interests as is sometimes claimed. The govern-
 ment's establishment of an at least partially protective tariff in the
 early 1930s reflected the basic needs of import-substituting industry
 (Ci Hongfei i985a). There was wide agreement, encompassing even
 Chen Guangfu (1949:170-I) that greater government control of the
 banking sector was a prerequisite for currency reform. Although our
 view of currency reform has inevitably been tainted by the 1940S
 inflation, before the war its effects were mainly beneficial (Ci Hongfei
 I985b), even if, as Coble (I980:203-4) argues, unintentionally so.
 Even military reunification and the restoration of order could be seen
 as necessary prerequisites for capitalist growth.
 Nevertheless, the state was unable and unwilling to offer genuine
 support to Chinese industry during the depression. It was unwilling to
 do so because its interest as state generated other higher priorities,
 and it had sufficient autonomy to pursue those priorities. It wished to
 avoid provoking Japan, being prepared to trade economic conces-
 sions, such as over the I934 tariff, for political breathing space. It also
 wished to maintain a level of armed force sufficient to crush the
 Chinese Communist Party and unify the country, and its need for
 revenue to do this limited its options in tariff policy and industrial
 relief; while impelling it to extend its control into the banking sector in
 order to ensure its supply of funds. The revenue needs of the state
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 were in fact a very common limiting factor in the institution of protec-
 tive tariffs (see for example Tignor I984:109). More importantly,
 however, the Chinese state was simply too weak to help industry. As a
 British diplomat remarked, it would require 'a government of bound-
 less authority and limitless perseverence' even to arrest the decay in
 China's external trade (PRO Fo37I/I8o52, Fi I/I I/Io). The Chinese
 government was far from having 'boundless authority' or the
 relatively high level of institutionalization required successfully to
 pursue policies of economic development or economic control (Rues-
 chemeyer and Evans I985:5I-3). In this period it clearly lacked the
 bureaucratic machinery to enforce many of the policies requested by
 the capitalists.
 Structural factors also constrained the state's actions. Indeed,
 although China's limited integration into the world economy gave
 natural protection to many areas and sectors, in the modern coastal
 sector the Nationalist government could do little to mitigate the effects
 of an economic fluctuation that defeated much stronger states. Its
 options were limited by China's position in the world economy and by
 the social, international and geographical limitations on its own con-
 trol within China. In the international market, China was almost
 entirely a price-taker, and attempts to cut the country off from that
 market would have their own costs: indeed JiangJieshi accepted that
 China was 'an integral part of the world economic system' (Kirby
 I984:79).
 Within China, residual warlordism and Japanese aggression
 prevented the government extending its sovereignty across the whole
 country, while its weak hold over the rural sector forced it into
 dependence on revenues from modern industry and trade. The
 government wanted to help the capitalists, but in the end did not have
 the power to do so. As a Nationalist elder with close links to cotton
 interests remarked in 1934, Jiang Jieshi's pronouncements 'made a
 great show of being earnest, but in the end amounted merely to empty
 words' (SSKY 80:1 .4 18).
 Whether one should read back the extremes of wartime and post-
 war government control over the economy into the 1930s is therefore
 questionable. 'Bureaucratic capitalism' in the inflated form that later
 came to characterize China was only one of the possible historical
 outcomes of the system of political economy emerging in the I930S,
 and one which was highly influenced by the exigencies of the war.
 Many authors have seen the interests of the 'bureaucratic capitalists'
 as fundamentally opposed to those of 'national capitalists' (Coble
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 I980). In addition to appearing to be borne out by China's immediate
 post-war history, such a view conveniently met the Communist
 Party's need to recruit the national bourgeoisie. An alternative view
 focusing on the I930S might, however, be to see the bureaucratic
 capitalists as one fragment of the capitalist class. In Indonesia 'the
 politico-bureaucrats [were able] to appropriate state authority,
 resources and powers for private use' in a way very similar to what
 happened in China in the I930s. But these 'primitive accumulators'
 later became more regular capitalists 'following a more normal path
 of accumulation through the generation of profits by capital invest-
 ment' (Robison 1985:316). Such a process was at most incipient in
 1930s China, but it does suggest the possibility of other outcomes.
 Indeed, one of China's leading private business figures, Chen
 Guangfu (1961:87), despite his opposition to the I935 nationalization
 of the banks, still felt optimistic about China's prospects on the eve of
 war:
 Judging by my experience as a banker, I would say that the years I936 and
 I937 up to the outbreak of the war were [good] years. First there was
 stability in currency . . . Secondly there was no price increase, or very little
 price increase. Third, there was progress in industry and commerce. I felt
 very hopeful for China's future.
 Thus the position taken in this paper is one that recognizes the
 considerable degree of autonomy exhibited by the Nationalist state,
 but stresses also the constraints put on that autonomy by the national
 and international situation within which the state operated. In its
 relations with business, it is not clear that 'bureaucratic capitalism'
 represented at this time a fundamental threat to the development of
 Chinese national capital. The government's failure to relieve the
 depression in Chinese business resulted less from an unwillingness
 than from an inability to do so, given its low level of institutionaliza-
 tion, its lack of resources and its weak position in the international
 economic and political system.
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